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Assessing the Impact of the ECHR 
on National Legal Systems
Helen Keller and Alec Stone Sweet
This book tracks and evaluates the impact of the ECHR on eighteen national 
legal orders. As the reports demonstrate, national systems are increasingly porous 
to the influence of the ECHR and the case law of its Court. European States no 
longer embody insular, autonomous, self-defined legal systems, if ever they did. 
At the constitutional level, the systems of every country surveyed in this volume 
have experienced significant structural change. To take two dramatic examples, 
judges once prohibited from engaging in judicial review of statute now do so rou-
tinely, with reference to European rights; and the dualist features of many legal 
systems have given way to a sophisticated monism, when it comes to the Con-
vention. Further, how the different branches of Government interact with one 
another has been changed, radically in some States, to the extent that the regime’s 
evolution has served to undermine traditional separation of powers dogmas. This 
volume also examines the impact of the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence on 
legislators, executives, and judges. Thousands of discreet legal and policy out-
comes have been altered as a result of the influence of Convention rights. It is also 
clear that legal education and scholarship are also changing in ways that will help 
to consolidate the regime’s domestic presence and legitimacy.
The impact of the ECHR is organized by a complex social process that we call 
reception.1 The reports identify a diverse range of mechanisms of reception: those 
stable procedures that national officials construct and use in order to adapt the 
national legal order to the ECHR, as it develops over time. The reports show that 
no State can fully insulate itself from the regime’s reach and influence. The best 
States can do is to build and maintain their own system of strong national rights 
protection, and to develop effective mechanisms of reception. The reports also 
show that the intensity of the influence of the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg 
Court on domestic systems varies widely across States; and the Court’s impact 
has increased over time, in some legal domains more than others, within each 
1  Reception is defined and discussed at length in chapter 1 of this book, Section B.1.
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State. Although we will venture a number of general propositions about recep-
tion processes in this chapter, such statements should be carefully considered in 
light of the cross-national and temporal diversity documented and evaluated in 
the national reports.
A. Reception as Process
Viewed as a cross-national phenomenon, the reception of the ECHR into domes-
tic law and practice can neither be easily summarized, nor neatly encapsulated 
in overarching generalizations. Indeed, it would seem to be all but impossible to 
model the Court’s impact on States in any scientifically parsimonious way. The 
reasons are clear enough. First, although we can identify the most important 
factors that condition, or impinge upon, the reception process, not all of these 
factors are present or carry the same weight across all jurisdictions. When they 
are present, they typically combine in diverse ways to affect States differently. Sec-
ond, the ECHR regime – considered sociologically as a continuous set of interac-
tions between individual applicants, national political and legal systems, and the 
Strasbourg Court – does not possess a stable social structure. Convention rights, 
for example, have evolved in ways that have been virtually impossible to predict, 
not least by national officials, from any specific ex ante moment. States have been 
put under pressure to adapt national law to the Convention, but the manner in 
which they have done so has never been fixed or pre-determined. Instead, the re-
lationship between the ECHR and domestic legal orders has been an open-ended 
product of interactive social processes. In this section, the most important factors 
that have impinged upon the reception process will be briefly analyzed. 
1. Accession and Expansion
Most of the original Contracting States (including the UK, Ireland, Italy, Ger-
many, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Norway and Sweden in this volume) 
seriously underestimated the degree to which the ECHR would impact on their 
domestic legal systems. The travaux préparatoires provide scant evidence to the 
contrary. When the ECHR entered into force, none of these States (with the 
important exception of Ireland) possessed effective systems of rights protection 
in the contemporary sense. The fact that the Convention system developed dur-
ing the same period that many national systems of rights protection emerged and 
matured no doubt facilitated the Court’s efforts to build its own political legiti-
macy. During this formative period, the absence of sceptical States, such as France 
(which was hostile to supranational authority in general) was a benefit: the Court 
avoided the kinds of head-on collisions that had paralyzed the EC in the 60’s and 
70’s. Both France and Switzerland (which was concerned with issues of neutral-
ity) ratified relatively late, after several failed tries. For other late-ratifying States 
(Spain, Slovakia, Poland and the re-ratification of Greece after military rule), 
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the political legitimacy of the Convention and the Court was largely taken for 
granted. Each of these States were then in the throes of democratization, follow-
ing long years under repressive, authoritarian rule. Democracy and rights pro-
tection were strongly equated. It is testimony to the remarkable success of the 
ECHR that, for these States, the Convention offered an established, “external”, 
and therefore legitimate, normative standard for the transition to constitutional 
democracy. Accession would serve, in effect, to certify their membership in the 
circle of good European countries, otherwise dominated by Western Europe. 
These States ratified the Convention enthusiastically without lodging important 
reservations. Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine also took advantage of certification, if 
perhaps with less commitment to common values.
The use of declarations and reservations also varies across States and time. 
Some countries (France, Switzerland) once made extensive use of reservations 
and declarations; others have done so sparingly or not at all (Poland). Some States 
(Turkey) did not seriously examine the compatibility of national law with the 
ECHR at the time of ratification. Over time, the use of reservations and declara-
tions has declined, and many States have allowed those they had lodged to elapse. 
One reason for this is that, as it has evolved, the Convention system has gained 
the trust and goodwill of its members; consider the ratification of Protocol no. 11, 
and the broad incorporation of the ECHR into national law. At the same time, 
most countries have made considerable progress in redressing incompatibilities 
between the domestic law and the Convention guarantees. Reservations made 
it possible for many States to join the regime, given quite specific concerns, but 
these concerns have been relaxed with changing circumstances and socialization 
into the regime. For its part, the ECtHR interprets reservations narrowly, to en-
sure that the Contracting Parties do not undermine the Convention’s purposes.2 
The Council of Europe, too, has played an important role in developing Con-
vention rights. It is a well-established practice of international law for States to 
amend treaties to which they belong through supplementary instruments, like 
protocols. Since 1952, the Council of Europe has adopted fourteen Protocols 
to the ECHR. Most importantly, Protocol no. 11 reformed the institutional 
structure, and made obligatory State acceptance of the individual complaint pro-
cedure and of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. Today, acceptance of Protocol 
no. 11 is a pre-condition for the ratification of the ECHR.3 In hindsight, we 
observe that the ratification of Protocols nos 2, 3, 5 and 8 proved to be relatively 
unproblematic, and all Contracting States would eventually ratify them. It is im-
portant, therefore, to recognize that the Contracting States have themselves fully 
participated in expanding the Court’s competences, as well as the ECHR’s rights 
2 Belilos v. Switzerland (appl. no. 10328/83), Judgement (Plenary), 29 April 1988, Series A, Vol. 
132. See in extenso Thurnherr, this volume, Section A.2.b.
3 Protocol no. 9 has been repealed as from 1 November 1998, the date of entry into force of 
Protocol no. 11. Since then, Protocol no. 10 has lost its purpose.
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catalogue, including rights to peaceful enjoyment of property, to education, and 
to free elections by secret ballot, and the abolition of the death penalty.
These reforms have fundamentally altered the ECHR, compared with the sta-
tus quo ex ante of the 50’s. When the ECHR was negotiated, States failed to agree 
on the inclusion of the right to property. In the end, Article 6(1) ECHR provided 
for procedural guarantees for “civil rights”, which the Court interpreted broadly, 
but not so broadly as to include property rights per se. The right to property in 
Protocol no. 1,4 which entered into force in 1954, proved to be tremendously 
important in the 90’s, as statistics on the Court’s activities demonstrate. In the 
post-Protocol no. 11 era, the Court has been flooded with applications claiming 
violations of the right to property, which have in turn revealed systemic failures 
(Greece, Italy, and Turkey’s administration of Cyprus). Having received literally 
hundreds of clone applications from Poland, the Court began to experiment with 
pilot judgments to help States resolve such failures.5
On the other hand, Protocol no. 4 generated reluctance, with Greece, Turkey, 
Italy, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, among the States covered in 
this book, withholding ratification. That Protocol established human rights in 
a politically sensitive domain (inter alia prohibiting expulsion of nationals and 
collective expulsion of aliens); States that ratified it may now regret having done 
so.6 In another once sensitive area – the death penalty – the Council of Europe 
has had more success, banning its use through Protocols no. 6 and no. 13. Russia 
alone has not ratified these Protocols. Russia is also the only country that blocks 
the entry into force of Protocol no. 14, which the Court, the Council of Europe, 
and we see as an essential reform, given the regime’s present burdens.7 Russia’s 
general reluctance to enhance the discretionary authority of the Court should be 
understood in the context of the conflict-filled relationship it has with both the 
ECHR and the Council of Europe.8
Finally, the fate of Protocol no. 12 (non-discrimination) remains an open 
question. Among the States covered in our survey, only the Netherlands, Spain,9 
and Ukraine have ratified it. The others resist transitioning from the limited non-
discrimination guarantee provided by the Convention (Article 14 ECHR) to a 
general, stand-alone right on various grounds. Failure to ratify Protocol no. 12 
(only 16 of the 46 States have done so10) may well be a blessing in disguise for the 
 4 Among the countries in our survey, Switzerland is now the only country that has not yet 
ratified. See, this volume, Thurnherr, Section A.2.a.
 5 Broniowski v. Poland (appl. no. 31443/96), Judgement (Grand Chamber), 22 June 2004, Re-
ports 2004-V, 1. See Krzyżanowska-Mierzewska, this volume, Section H.1.a.
 6 For the situation in Spain, see Candela Soriano, this volume, Section III.A.1.a.
 7 See also infra Section E.3.
 8 See Nußberger, this volume, Section A.1.a.
 9 Spain ratified Protocol no. 12 on 13 February 2008, after this book went into production.
 10 Information on ratification presented by the Council of Europe on its website: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=177&CM=8&DF=3/2/2008&
CL=ENG (Unless indicated otherwise, all websites were visited last at end of March 2008).
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system. The Court is already overloaded; and non-discrimination claims would 
require it to intrude even more deeply into policy areas that are, by their very 
nature, politically controversial. It may be that some national Governments have 
reached a saturation point, feeling that the time is not ripe to develop new hu-
man rights standards, given the density of problems that have yet to be resolved.
2. European Integration and Reception
European integration – the evolution of the EU’s legal system, in particular – has 
shaped reception in a number of crucial ways. First, the ECJ’s commitment to 
the doctrines of the supremacy and direct effect of Community law provoked 
processes that, ultimately, transformed national law and practice. Supremacy re-
quired national courts to review the legality of statutes with respect to EC law, 
and to give primacy to EC norms in any conflict with national norms. For judges 
in many EU States, the reception of supremacy meant overcoming a host of con-
stitutional orthodoxies, including the prohibition of judicial review of statute, 
the lex posteriori derogat legi priori, and separation of powers notions. These same 
structural issues arose anew under the Convention. Second, as the EU’s legal 
system evolved, national judges were required to develop new remedies, includ-
ing in the sensitive area of State liability for damages to individuals. Further, as 
the ECJ embraced the proportionality principle in one area after another (e.g., 
the four freedoms, sex discrimination, administrative and competition law), it 
pressured national courts to replace deference postures (under manifest error, 
reasonableness and ultra vires doctrines, for example) with much more intrusive 
forms of judicial review (requirements of necessity and proper balancing of rights 
against the public good). Although one can describe these innovations in formal 
doctrinal language, it is indisputable that these changes served to enhance judi-
cial authority – across the Community – relative to political authority. Further, 
national courts also learned to interact closely, and to enter into a dialogue with 
a supranational court, giving to, as well as receiving from, the ECJ. The ECJ’s 
move to embrace rights as general principles of EU law, citing the ECHR and the 
constitutional traditions of the Member States as sources, is a striking example. 
Thus, in a myriad ways, European legal integration under the Treaty of Rome 
helped to prepare national legal systems for the kinds of major challenges that 
were to come under the ECHR.
With the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, the EU worked to reinforce the au-
thority of the ECHR in a more direct way. In the 90’s, the EU (whose Members 
also belonged to the Council of Europe) made ratifying the ECHR a prerequisite 
for EU membership,11 which entailed a great deal of preparatory work in the 
human rights field for candidate countries in Central Europe.12 In two States 
covered in this volume, Poland and Slovakia, the EU demanded specific reforms 
11 Pinelli (2004).
12 In Greece and Turkey, the implementation of EU law and the accession process has served as a 
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(countering anti-corruption, enhancing judicial independence and efficiency, 
re-organizing the penitentiary system, etc.) to safeguard the rule of law and the 
effective guarantee of Convention’s rights.
3. Mechanisms of Reception and Coordination
The national reports make it possible to evaluate mechanisms of reception in 
terms of their relative capacity to enhance the ECHR’s status in domestic law. The 
ECHR can be said to be effective, domestically, to the extent that national offi-
cials recognize, enforce, and give full effect to Convention rights and the interpre-
tive authority of the Court, in their decisions. The most important mechanisms 
operate at the constitutional level and are associated with the monist-dualist dis-
tinction and how States incorporate the ECHR. They serve to coordinate the 
national legal order, as a whole, on an ongoing basis, with the Convention. Other 
mechanisms operate in discrete institutional settings, including those procedures 
that require legislative and judicial officials to take account of the ECHR in their 
decision-making. A third set of practices – related to knowledge and its produc-
tion – also impinge on the reception process and, arguably, ought to be consid-
ered to be informal mechanisms of coordination, in their own right.
a. Doctrinal Factors
A formal, doctrinal understanding of the reception process is an indispensable 
first step in any attempt to explain the impact of the ECHR on national legal 
systems. The reports focus on four interrelated questions. First, does a given con-
stitutional order adopt a monist or dualist posture with respect to international 
treaty law? Second, what rank does the legal system assign to the Convention in 
the national hierarchy of norms? Third, are the Convention’s guarantees directly 
binding on public authority, can they be pleaded before national courts, and 
can judges directly enforce them against conflicting national norms, including 
statute? And, fourth, have the answers to these questions changed over time, and 
through what procedures? The national reports address these questions, and they 
trace the impact of these formal elements on the decision-making of national 
officials.
The domestification of the ECHR constitutes the most important, overarching 
narrative of this volume. Convention rights are domesticated through their incor-
poration into national legal orders. As Polakiewicz has emphasized,13 the ECHR 
does not require any specific mode of incorporation and, for many decades, some 
States refused to incorporate it. Until the 80’s, for example, the French position 
was that the Convention had virtually no legal status in the internal order. In 
that State’s view, a High Contracting Party, faced with a violation of the Conven-
more direct catalyst for changes in the domestic law than the reception of the ECHR, see Kaboğlu 
and Koutnatzis, this volume, Section D.3.
13 Polakiewicz (2001), 31–33.
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tion, entirely discharged its responsibilities merely by compensating the affected 
applicant. It incurred no obligation to change its internal law even when the 
Court had ruled that law to be in breach of the Convention. Today, every State 
covered by this book has incorporated the Convention, albeit in different ways, 
and no States argue in favour of the former French position.
Other things being equal, the ECHR is most effective where Convention 
rights, de jure and de facto: (1) bind all national officials in the exercise of public 
authority; (2) possess at least supra-legislative status (they occupy a rank superior 
to that of statutory law in the hierarchy of legal norms), and (3) can be pleaded 
directly by individuals before judges who may directly enforce, while disapplying 
conflicting norms. In such States, the Convention is not subject to the principle of 
lex posteriori derogat legi priori, but takes precedence over all conflicting infra-con-
stitutional norms. From the point of view of the international lawyer, the status of 
these systems toward the ECHR can be characterized as strongly monist. Among 
West European States covered in this book, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Spain, and Switzerland have reached this position, through different routes. Of 
course, the fact that national officials, including judges, are well positioned to 
enforce the ECHR does not mean that they will always choose to do so.
b. Incorporation and the Hierarchy of Norms
One of our core comparative findings is that formal distinctions between system-
ic monism and systemic dualism ex ante do not, in and of themselves, determine 
the status of the ECHR in national law ex post. What ultimately matters is if and 
how the Convention is incorporated. France, for example, is a monist country, 
under Article 55 of its Constitution. However, for decades, Article 55 was simply 
overridden by the prohibition of judicial review of statutes (a corollary of separa-
tion of powers).14 Belgium is formally dualist, but that State’s courts – on their 
own and without constitutional authorization – embraced a sophisticated mon-
ism with respect to the ECHR (and EU law).15 As the national reports show, over 
the past three decades, the ECHR has had far more impact in Belgium than in 
France, precisely because Belgian judges chose to confer supra-legislative status 
on Convention rights and to directly apply them, while French judges declined 
to do so. The French position began to change only in the late 80’s; today, the 
Convention overrides conflicting law, including statutes adopted later in time. 
Consequently, complex reception processes are now underway in France, and the 
gap between the Convention’s de jure and de facto status is bound to narrow.
The Spanish and Dutch Constitutions are both monist but, again, it is the po-
sition of the courts that makes the difference. The Spanish Constitutional Court 
has consistently worked to enforce the ECHR as a quasi-constitutional body of 
law. The Tribunal will strike down any statutes that violate the Convention as un-
14 For the reasons, see Lambert-Abdelgawad and Weber, this volume, Section B.1.a.
15 De Wet, this volume, Section B.2.a.
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constitutional; it interprets Spanish constitutional rights in light of the ECHR; 
and it has ordered the ordinary courts to abide by the Strasbourg Court’s case 
law, as a matter of constitutional obligation. If the judiciary ignores the dictates 
of the Convention, individuals can use the amparo procedure to appeal the issue 
directly to the Constitutional Tribunal. In Spain, then, the capacity of the legal 
system to guarantee the effectiveness of the ECHR is virtually perfect. Indeed, 
by every measure, Spain is one of the great success stories of post-authoritarian, 
rights-based democratization, and the ECHR is an important part of that story. 
The Netherlands, arguably, is the world’s most monist State. The Dutch Con-
stitution provides for the supremacy of treaty law over the Constitution itself, 
but it does not provide for the judicial review of Statutes. The Supreme Court, 
however, has chosen to directly enforce the ECHR, in effect, incorporating it as a 
de facto Bill of Rights. In her report, Erika de Wet notes that, generally, the Dutch 
Court has thus far used its judicial review powers cautiously.16 However, she also 
stresses that the relationship between the courts and the legislature is changing as 
a result, and that the Court is developing some of the features of a constitutional 
jurisdiction with respect to rights enforcement.
Norway and Sweden are formally dualist States, but each has moved to monist 
positions with respect to the Convention, embracing the effectiveness criteria 
listed above, at least formally. Austria blends both dualist and monist features, 
but it too has moved to a strong monist posture. The Austrian Constitution 
provides for a Constitutional Court and review, but it contains only a short 
list of rights in comparison with the Convention. The Constitutional Court’s 
initial position, which the administrative and civil courts followed, was that the 
ECHR neither possessed supra-legislative status nor was directly enforceable in 
the domestic legal order. In 1964, the political parties revised the Constitution, 
to confer upon the Convention constitutional status and direct effect. Today, 
conflicts between the Austrian Constitution and the ECHR are governed by the 
lex posteriori derogat legi priori rule, an apparently unique situation. Norway and 
Sweden also possessed, at the time of ratification, a short list of basic rights, and 
judicial review was known but virtually never used. In the 90’s, four decades 
later, both countries adopted comprehensive Bills of Rights modeled on the 
Convention. In Norway, the charter is entrenched, requiring two successive votes 
of Parliament, the second after an intervening election. The Charter overrides 
conflicting statutes. The Swedish Charter has only the rank of a statute, and 
Sweden maintains certain dualist orthodoxies, including the application of the 
lex posteriori rule to resolve conflicts between norms of statutory rank. However, 
the Constitution states that all Swedish laws shall be interpreted and applied in 
light of international treaties.
A State may be formally monist but nonetheless treat the Convention as alien, 
foreign law, leaving it without much force in the domestic order. Such has been 
16 De Wet, this volume, Section B.1.b.bb. 
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the case, for different reasons, in pre-Protocol no. 11 France, and – today – in 
Russia, Slovakia, Turkey (at least until 2004), and the Ukraine. In these latter 
States, a surface, systemic monism is belied by a lack of commitment to the 
ECHR among political officials, and by massive structural problems in the 
functioning of judicial institutions. In Poland, a nominally monist State, the 
Constitutional Court has worked hard to enhance the status of the Convention 
before the courts.
Finally, most dualist systems have incorporated the Convention either through 
statute or the decisions of Constitutional or Supreme Courts, the details and 
consequences of which vary widely. In the UK, under the 2000 Human Rights 
Act (HRA) litigants may plead Convention rights against any public author-
ity, and courts may enforce the ECHR against all but conflicting Parliamentary 
statutes, while certain appellate judges have the authority to declare such statutes 
incompatible with Convention rights (but not to annul them). As Besson’s report 
emphasizes, the HRA is in the process of transforming the UK’s legal system, not 
least, because it carves out important exceptions to doctrines of Parliamentary 
sovereignty.17 For the first time, UK judges have jurisdiction over what is, in 
effect, a Bill of Rights. In Ireland, which incorporated the ECHR in 2003, Con-
vention rights function only as a supplement to its own highly effective domestic 
Charter and system of rights protection. Parties may not plead the Convention 
in Irish courts against judges or the legislature, and the lex posteriori rule holds 
sway, but this situation has yet to expose Ireland to the scrutiny and censure of 
the Strasbourg Court in any systematic way.
In Germany and Italy, both dualist States with complete systems of domestic 
rights protection, the incorporation has proceeded through rulings of the con-
stitutional courts. In Germany, the ECHR was initially treated according to 
dualist orthodoxy: treaty law occupied the same rank as statute (lex posteriori 
taking primacy in case of conflict). Gradually, however, the Federal Constitu-
tional Court began to treat the ECHR as lex specialis and, in 2004, it threw its 
weight behind the ECHR. It now requires the judiciary to enforce Convention 
rights even against statutes passed later in time, an activity that can be monitored 
through the individual constitutional complaint. In Italy, the courts’ attitude to-
wards the Convention has been marked by longstanding reluctance to recognize 
the Convention’s primacy over statutes. In this context, a 2007 ruling of the 
Italian Constitutional Court declaring the unconstitutionality of a statute found 
to contravene Article 1 of Protocol no. 1, may well be a landmark change.18 It 
remains to be seen whether this new approach will be followed consistently by 
the Italian Constitutional Court and other high courts.
In summary, there is no necessary causal linkage between ex ante monism 
or dualism, on the one hand, and the reception of the ECHR on the other. 
17 See Besson, this volume, Section III.B.1.b. 
18 See Candela Soriano, this volume, Section III.B.2.b.
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Put differently, the manner in which the ECHR is incorporated is an outcome 
of the reception process which will, in turn, impinge on reception ex post. The 
assumption that dualistic States have, a priori, an unfriendly attitude towards 
international law, and will, therefore, generate a relatively poorer rights record, is 
untenable. That point accepted, some States – including Ireland, Norway, Italy, 
Sweden, and the UK – have found it difficult to confer supra-legislative rank on 
the Convention, precisely because of their dualist natures, though there is a great 
deal of variation even among this small group.19 Other dualist States (notably 
Belgium) have done so relatively quickly and easily. Dualistic countries tend to 
incorporate through statute, whereas monist States tend to do so through judicial 
decisions. Clearly, a monistic constitutional structure can provide the judiciary 
with more leeway in the reception process, as in the Netherlands, helping courts 
overcome certain obstacles when they are motivated to do so. Finally, in dualistic 
countries where a powerful Constitutional or Supreme Court defends national 
human rights, we observe reticence among judges to base their rulings on the 
Convention as an independent source of rights. This is the case with Germany, 
Italy, and Ireland. Paradoxically, perhaps, a pre-existing human rights judicial 
tradition in a particular country can sometimes hamper reception of the Conven-
tion or, at least, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.
c. The Convention as a Shadow Constitution
Today, in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK, we can 
say that the ECHR constitutes a kind of surrogate, or shadow, Constitution. 
These are States that, while not possessing their own judicially enforceable Bills of 
Rights have incorporated the Convention in ways that make Convention rights 
directly effective, supra-legislative norms in the domestic system. In the Scan-
dinavian countries in our survey, new Bills of Rights have been modeled on the 
ECHR, but the latter text tends to be more important than the former. This type 
of reception is deeply structural and is, or will be, momentous in its significance. 
In States where Constitutions provide both an entrenched Bill of Rights and an 
effective system of constitutional justice, the ECHR tends to function as a sup-
plement to the Constitution. We find this situation in Germany, Ireland, Spain 
and, arguably, in some Central European States.
d. Legislative Coordination Mechanisms 
As the ECHR has evolved, national officials have developed procedures designed 
to provide legislative authorities with information and counsel on the relevance of 
the ECHR to their agenda. In many States (including Austria, Belgium, France, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Spain, and Switzerland), one of the tasks of the 
Government’s legal advisor is to provide an opinion on the conformity of pro-
19 With regard to the differences between the UK and Ireland, see Besson, this volume, Recapitu-
lative comparative table.
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posed Bills with the Convention, or on reforms that ought to be undertaken in 
order to bring the national legal order into conformity. The Government is free 
to disregard this advice. In most States (an important exception is Russia), one or 
more Parliamentary Committees also routinely examine the conventionality of 
Bills. In some (including France, Greece, Ireland, and Italy), lawmakers are now 
advised by independent Human Rights Committees. In Poland and Spain, an 
Ombudsman may advise executive and legislative bodies, and she or he possesses 
the power to challenge laws before the Constitutional Court. In Scandinavia, ex 
ante review of a legislative Bill is undertaken by judges, but these decisions (of the 
Swedish Law Council and the Norwegian Supreme Court) are non-binding. By 
contrast, in Ukraine, a 2006 reform made ex ante Ministerial review of the con-
ventionality of proposed legislation obligatory. If a Bill is found to be contrary to 
the ECtHR, it will be declared void. 
Although the national reports identify and discuss these mechanisms, much 
more research would be needed to evaluate their effects on policy outcomes. 
Their impact on the overall reception process, we suspect, depends heavily on 
the general commitment of political officials to improving rights protection and 
compliance with the ECHR. Many Russian national officials regularly expressed 
scorn for the Court’s judgements. In Turkey, the Chairman of the Human Rights 
Advisory Board was prosecuted in 2004 for authoring a report criticising the 
Government’s lack of commitment to rights, and the Board was then dissolved. 
Some States have no such mechanisms per se, but we know that German legisla-
tors take very seriously their responsibility to assess the conventionality of Bills 
before them, both in the Cabinet and the Bundestag, whereas Russian lawmakers 
do not.
e. Judicial and Other Ex Post Mechanisms of Coordination
Judges play a special role in the reception process. Due to the requirement that 
local remedies be exhausted, it is normally the courts that have the last word on 
the compatibility of national law with the ECHR, prior to an applicant going 
to Strasbourg. In addition, the Convention establishes standards that govern the 
operation of national systems of justice (notably through Articles 5, 6, and 13 
ECHR). Of all national officials, judges are the most systematically exposed to 
the direct supervision of the ECtHR. It is hardly surprising that, in many States, 
the courts have taken the lead in incorporating the Convention, and in strength-
ening other quasi-constitutional mechanisms of reception. Today, all national 
high courts have a powerful interest in closely monitoring the ECtHR’s activities, 
and in staying one step ahead of the latter when it comes to developing standards 
of rights protection. Such may be easier said than done, of course.
The national reports provide a rich trove of detail on specific interactions between 
the ECtHR and national courts. At the risk of some over-generalization, three 
overlapping points deserve emphasis. First, in most States, the incorporation of 
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the ECHR has enhanced the overall authority of the ordinary courts vis-à-vis all 
other non-judicial officials. As judges have consolidated their jurisdiction over the 
ECHR, they have increased their capacities to control policy outcomes; the move 
to proportionality review is a strong example.20 In Europe today, judicial author-
ity includes the competence to review the legal validity of all Government acts 
under the Convention. Second, the authority of national Constitutional Courts 
has been weakened: their final word (if not monopoly) on rights interpretation 
can no longer be presumed. It is to the credit of the constitutional courts on the 
continent (in Spain, Poland, Slovakia; and, more recently, in Germany and Italy) 
that they have chosen to require the judiciary – as a matter of constitutional 
duty – to enforce the ECHR and to follow the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence. 
At the same time, all constitutional courts have taken pains to stress that it is the 
national Constitution that ultimately regulates the relationship between the do-
mestic legal order and the Convention system. Third, rights protection in Europe 
is characterized by an important jurisdictional pluralism, an “open architecture”21 
whose tensions and contradictions will not be worked out easily, if at all. With 
the accession of the EU to the Convention, this architecture will become even 
more complex and its future development even less predictable.
The courts also manage the most important reception mechanisms follow-
ing a finding of violation by the ECtHR, to the extent that they harmonize the 
substance of their jurisprudence to relevant judgments of the Court. Courts in 
most States do so routinely (though Russian, Ukrainian, and Turkish courts are 
exceptions). The national reports also identify a number of non-judicial ex post 
mechanisms of coordination. The fast-track procedure in the UK is a prominent 
example22; and it will be fascinating to monitor the Ukrainian experiment, just 
underway, to build a host of innovative mechanisms of reception, in order to im-
prove its future record.23 Some States have also adopted major legislative reforms 
in order to deal with failures of a systemic nature identified by the Court. Italian 
lawmakers, for instance, fashioned the Azzolini law with the hope of improving 
its capacity – notoriously infirm – to implement the Court’s rulings.24
f. Informal Mechanisms: Knowledge and Practice
The state of knowledge about the ECHR and the Court’s jurisprudence in na-
tional legal systems conditions the reception process in obvious ways. The more 
ignorant of the Convention are national officials, the less likely it is that they 
will be able to perform their duties properly. In all States, teaching and scholarly 
research about the ECHR and the Court’s case law have steadily increased since 
the entry into force of Protocol no. 11 in 1998, but problems remain. Among 
20 See infra C.4
21 Krisch (2008). 
22 See Besson, this volume, Section III.E.1.b.
23 See Nußberger, this volume, Section E.2.a.
24 See Candela Soriano, this volume, Section III.E.2.
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lawyers and lower court judges in many States, knowledge of the Court’s case law 
and access to translations of judgments involving applications from other States 
remains poor, a situation that weakens the judiciary’s overall capacity to guaran-
tee the ECHR’s effectiveness.25
One negative finding concerning practice deserves comment. As the 
importance of the ECHR to domestic law increased, we expected networks of 
human rights litigators and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to grow 
at both the national and transnational levels. We also expected that these net-
works would steadily develop capacity to influence the reception process. While 
human rights NGOs have at least some relevance in most States, none of the 
reports shows that they regularly exercise decisive influence on important out-
comes.26 Further, law firms seem to have little incentive to invest in the domain. 
Compared with litigating EU law in national courts, which typically has a heavy 
commercial content, the sums at stake in litigating the ECHR are relatively 
small. If a case does make it through the admissibility stage in Strasbourg, it will 
be subject to long delay and little hope of a large financial payout. Despite these 
initial findings, more systematic research on the organization and impact of hu-
man rights litigating in Europe is clearly needed.
B. The Court’s Docket
In this section, we examine, from the point of view of the reception process, in-
puts into the ECHR legal system (applications) and the most important outputs 
(judgements of the Court and other decisions).
1. Applications to the ECtHR
The entry into force of Protocol no. 11 on November 1, 1998 removed any for-
mal obstacle to access to the Court for individuals, beyond the requirement that 
petitioners exhaust available domestic remedies. In addition, the Court makes 
applying to it simple and virtually cost-free: the required forms and easy-to-follow 
instructions are posted online, and applicants do not need legal counsel, at least 
not initially. The data on Post-Protocol no. 11 applications are, therefore, a fairly 
direct measure of the social demand for rights protection under the Convention. 
Table 1 reports these data, broken down by State and per annum.
25 See also the Committee of Ministers Recommendation Rec (2004)4 on the ECHR in universi-
ties and professional training, 12 May 2004.
26 For a prominent exception concerning the Warsaw Helsinki Foundation of Human Rights, see 
Krzyżanowska-Mierzewska, this volume, Section J.1.g.
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Table 1: Individual Applications to the ECtHR 
(November 1, 1998–December 31 2006)
Received Per Year Per Cap.* Admissible Per Cap.** Rank p/c*
Average per state 12,631 1,546 41.29 332.4 (4.7%) 1.64
Spain 5,367 656.9 15.13 38 (1%) 0.108 2
Ireland 522 63.9 15.21 12 (2%) 0.357 4
Norway 603 73.8 16.04 17 (3%) 0.456 6
Germany 16,005 1,958 23.73 69 (0.4%) 0.101 1
Belgium 2,095 256.4 24.41 89 (4%) 1.038 11
UK 12.072 1,477.6 24.54 303 (3%) 0.616 9
Netherlands 3,641 445.6 27.33 57 (2%) 0.429 5
Greece 2,935 359.2 32.36 295 (10%) 3.252 17
Turkey 20,141 2,465.2 33.81 1,500 (7%) 2.518 15
Russia 48,791 5,972 41.93 353 (0.7%) 0.303 3
Switzerland 2,542 311.1 42.04 31 (1%) 0.513 8
France 23,582 2,886.4 47.39 590 (3%) 1.185 12
Sweden 3,590 439.4 48.82 37 (1%) 0.500 7
Ukraine 18,860 2,308.4 49.53 310  (2%) 0.813 10
Italy 24,141 2,954.8 50.42 1,617 (7%) 3.377 18
Austria 3,427 419.5 51.15 156 (5%) 2.329 14
Slovakia 3,823 467.9 86.64 133 (3%) 3.018 16
Poland 35,225 4,311.5 112.86 377 (1%) 1.206 13
* Calculated as the number of applications per State divided by population.
** Calculated as the number of admissible applications per State divided by population. Rank p/c refers to the 
ordinal ranking of States, from lowest to highest, on the basis of admissible applications generated, per capita.
The source for the raw data on applications is the annual Survey of Activities, the European Court of Human 
Rights, 1998–2006. The source for the population data is Eurostat (2006).
Applicants activate the ECHR’s legal system in order to achieve outcomes – jus-
tice, a change in national law and practice, and so on – that have been denied to 
them in the domestic system. Although any given application may be unique in 
important respects, it is reasonable to assume that the aggregate data can tell us 
something of general significance about the relationship between the ECHR and 
national legal orders. Consider, for example, the following simple proposition, in 
effect, a “pathology hypothesis”: the more a State violates the Convention rights 
of individuals, the more it will generate applications to Strasbourg. In this view 
of the regime, the ECHR functions to reveal problems in domestic orders which 
the Court helps States to resolve. The cross-national data will, therefore, chart the 
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relative extent to which rights are protected in national legal orders or, much the 
same thing, the degree to which States are in non-compliance with the Conven-
tion. This view has much to recommend it, but it does not provide a complete 
picture, as the case studies demonstrate.
A second view, which may partly overlap with the first, emphasizes a different 
function. The ECHR will be important to the extent that it fills important gaps 
in national legal orders. In those States that do not possess a comprehensive, 
entrenched Bill of Rights, for example, the ECHR may be used to perform that 
role, as a shadow Bill of Rights. If and how it does so depends heavily on how the 
Convention is incorporated into the national legal order. In addition, a State’s 
constitutional rights provisions may not accord precisely with the Convention, or 
national judges may give a narrower reading to a right than the Strasbourg Court, 
situations that will attract applicants to Strasbourg. In this account, the data will 
reflect, at least in part, gaps between domestic rights protection and the ECHR, 
as the latter evolves.
In contrast to the “pathology hypothesis”, we would not assume, under the 
“gap-filling hypothesis”, that levels of petitions only measure the extent of pathol-
ogy. The numbers may also chart a healthy social demand for perfecting rights 
protection in States whose basic commitment to protecting rights is already rela-
tively robust. In many contexts, national law is likely to be more ossified and path 
dependent than the more malleable Convention. In so far as it is, Strasbourg will 
attract applicants.
A third logic rests on a still more complex view of how individual applicants, 
national officials, and the Strasbourg Court interact with one another. This view 
takes seriously the capacity of the Court’s case law to “feedback” on petitioners 
and national officials. Applications from each country tend to be clustered in 
specific areas, due to pathology (including systemic failures), national gaps in 
protection, or for other reasons. Nonetheless, the extent to which applications in 
these domains increase over time will be partly a function of how the Court con-
structs its jurisprudence. If the Court responds positively to the demand for the 
expansion in the scope and application of a specific right, it will tend to attract 
more applications in that area. A feedback loop is thereby constituted. Theoreti-
cally, the inverse might be true. It is possible that applications will decline or stop 
altogether, in a given domain, if a State successfully adapts its law to the relevant 
case law. However, such instances may be rare in important areas of litigation in 
which relatively large or coherent classes of applicants are concerned. Petitions 
may actually increase even after a State adequately complies with a specific ruling, 
as individuals seek to extend the scope of a new interpretation of rights.
At the heart of this dynamic lies a tension (which inheres in rights adjudica-
tion more generally) between two functions of the Court. The Court constructs 
Convention rights as general norms, which it treats as having prospective legal 
consequences for States. At the same time, its powers are largely limited to the 
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rendering of individual (retrospective and particular) justice to victims of specific 
abuse. The Court may move to recognize a new right, or it may clarify the nature 
and scope of an existing right in an innovative way, while narrowly tailoring its 
ruling to the facts of the case. Indeed, this is a standard technique of judicial pru-
dence in rights adjudication. Yet this type of ruling invites future applications, 
whose purpose will be to extend the coverage of the right even further, given 
remaining restrictions of national law. In this view, then, numbers of applications 
will also reflect the Court’s own engagement in rights innovation, in the context 
of the social demand for such innovation (which varies cross-nationally).
Such propositions, and the data presented in Table 1, should be assessed in con-
junction with the case studies presented in this volume. In the left-hand column, 
States are listed, lowest to highest, in terms of the average annual number of 
applications generated per one million inhabitants. States are ranked ordinally, in 
the right-hand column, with reference to the annual number of applications that 
are judged to be admissible by the Court, on a per capita basis. These numbers 
comprise a direct measure of the extent to which each State contributes to estab-
lishing the Court’s agenda.
Not surprisingly, the States with the largest, most intractable, problems sup-
ply the Court with the bulk of its caseload. The average number of applications 
judged admissible by the Court per year, among our 18 States, is 40.6. Only five 
States – Russia, Poland, France, Turkey, and Italy, in that order – exceed this aver-
age. States that have relatively high levels of admissible applications per capita27 
also include Greece and Slovakia which, like France, Italy, Russia and the Ukraine, 
have not succeeded in rectifying various structural failures, particularly as regards 
the functioning of the judiciary. In its 2006 Report,28 the Court presented data 
on the 89,900 cases pending before it on 1 January 2007. Eight of the regime’s 
forty-seven States generated 70% of all pending cases: Russia (21.5%), Romania 
(12.1%), Turkey (10%), Ukraine (7.6%), Poland (5.7%), France (4.8%), Ger-
many (3.9%), and Italy (3.8%);29 and applications from the first five comprise a 
majority of pending cases. For the foreseeable future, then, the Court will expend 
the bulk of its time and resources dealing with pathology: massive structural 
problems in sometimes intransigent States.
The countries that generate the least number of admissible petitions per capita30 
are Germany, Ireland, and Spain, States that possess the most effective domestic 
27 Austria (14th) is also ranked in the bottom third of admissible applications per year, per capita. 
In Austria, a small State with a legalistic culture, the ECHR possesses directly effective, constitu-
tional status, but its courts remain hesitant to apply the Convention aggressively.
28 European Court of Human Rights, Annual Report 2006, Registry of the European Court of 
Human Rights, Strasbourg, 2007. 
29 Ibid., p. 114.
30 Third on that list is Russia (with by far the largest population). Arguably (see Nußberger’s 
report, this volume, Section D.2.e.), Russia has the worst record of rights protection among ECHR 
Contracting States (even blocking the mailing of applications to the Court). Petitions from Russia 
are now flooding the Court.
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systems of rights protection in Europe, as well as Norway, which possesses little 
experience with rights review. Although Belgium, Germany, Norway, Spain, and 
Switzerland, among other countries, interact with the ECHR less systematically 
or only sporadically than most of the States covered in this volume, the influence 
of the ECHR on their respective legal systems should not be underestimated. 
Considered on their own, each is experiencing significant legal change as a result 
of membership in the regime. As the respective national reports show, we find 
some of the dynamics of gap filling and feedback discussed above. The ECHR is 
an important structural backdrop, and the Court is a powerful agent, for steady 
progress in the direction of stronger rights protection.
2. Findings of Violations
Cross-national data on rulings of violation against States are relatively direct 
measures of the pressure that the ECHR regime places on national officials to 
adapt national legal orders to the Convention. Table 2 reports this information 
for the 18 States examined in this volume. States are listed, from lowest to highest, 
with respect to the number of violations declared annually by the Court, since 
1 January 1998. States with the best records (under 6 violations found per year) 
include, in order, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Spain, the Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Belgium, and Germany. At the bottom of the table, with more than 50 violations 
found per year, we find France, Turkey, and Italy. If we control for population 
– ranking countries with respect to the number of violations per annum and 
per capita – the order changes dramatically. Spain and Germany have far better 
records than all other States in our survey; whereas Slovakia, Italy, and Greece (in 
that order) have the worst records.
Table 2: Rulings on the Merits and Friendly Settlements: 1998-2006
Judgements / Per Yr Violations / Per Yr / Per Cap* Non-Viol. FS**
Average 260.7 29 246.3 27.4 0.926 14.9 40.2
Ireland 11 1.2 7 0.8 0.190 (6) 4 0
Norway 10 1.1 8 0.8 0.173 (4) 2 0
Sweden 21 2.3 14 1.6 0.177 (5) 7 13
Spain 34 3.8 26 2.9 0.066 (1) 8 1
Netherlands 52 5.8 39 4.3 0.263 (7) 13 8
Switzerland 60 6.7 41 4.6 0.621 (11) 29 2
Belgium 57 6.3 51 5.7 0.542 (9) 6 7
Germany 67 7.4 53 5.9 0.071 (2) 14 4
Slovakia 112 12.4 107 11.9 2.203 (16) 5 17
Austria 120 13.3 111 12.3 1.500 (14) 9 17
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Judgements / Per Yr Violations / Per Yr / Per Cap* Non-Viol. FS**
UK 175 19.4 146 16.2 0.269 (8) 29 15
Russia 206 22.9 199 22.1 0.155 (3) 7 0
Ukraine 260 28.9 258 28.7 0.615 (10) 2 0
Greece 271 30.1 265 29.4 2.648 (18) 6 18
Poland 340 37.8 321 35.7 0.934 (13) 19 32
France 500 55.6 447 49.6 0.814 (12) 53 84
Turkey 1111 123.4 1080 120 1.646 (15) 31 182
Italy 1285 142.8 1260 140 2.389 (17) 25 324
* Ordinal rank in parentheses: Ireland is ranked sixth in terms of violations found per annum and per 1 million 
inhabitants; Spain is ranked first, and Greece last.
** Friendly settlements.
Source: Appendix, this volume.
Although our project was not designed to explain the cross-national variation 
depicted in Table 2, at least some of that variation is a product of the reception 
process. Those States with stable, robust systems of national rights protection 
(Germany, Ireland, Spain) are less vulnerable to censure from Strasbourg, all the 
more so once constitutional courts decided to require the judiciary to enforce 
both the Convention and the Court’s case law directly and with fidelity, even 
against Parliamentary statutes. The majority of States in our survey, however, did 
not possess strong domestic systems of constitutional justice when they began 
to confront a more expansive ECHR and a more aggressive Court. These States 
can best reduce their exposure to censure in Strasbourg by developing effective 
reception mechanisms: stable rules and procedures that serve to coordinate the 
national legal order and the ECHR, on an ongoing basis. As the national reports 
demonstrate, developing such mechanisms is rarely an easy, simple, or smooth 
process, to the extent that it requires significant structural change. Such change 
will usually be slow and incremental, at least at first. New mechanisms are typi-
cally grafted onto older, institutionally embedded, ways of doing things, and 
some officials may seek to resist change. The evidence presented in this book, 
however, shows that national officials are being steadily socialized into a Europe 
whose Convention not only binds the State, as a matter of international law, but 
also binds domestic officials, as a matter of enforceable national law. Those States 
for which the Convention now functions as a de facto or shadow Constitution 
(Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK, and, increasingly, Nor-
way, Sweden, and France) provide significant examples of these dynamics.
In some countries (including Italy, Poland), the commitment to protecting 
rights (of both Constitutional and Conventional origin) may be relatively high 
but insufficient, in itself, to counter certain structural deficiencies or specific 
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legal pathologies. In other countries (Austria, France), long-standing judicial 
resistance to the Court and its case law has undoubtedly exposed the national 
system to more applications and findings of violations than would have been 
the case had courts been more open to enforcing the ECHR. Finally, there are 
States whose commitment to rights has not always been strong, though gradually 
improving (Greece, Slovakia, and perhaps Ukraine); and there are States whose 
attitude toward the ECHR and its Court has been generally hostile (Russia, Tur-
key, and until recently Ukraine). In any event, as the data in Table 1 show,31 it 
is applications from States with the poorest records that dominate the Court’s 
docket.
C. The Court’s Impact on National Legal Systems
The Court protects Convention rights in multiple, highly differentiated ways. 
While we recognize that the Court operates under unified jurisdictional rules 
and procedures, the role it performs, in fact, varies across Convention norms 
and State contexts. The Court functions (1) as a kind of High Cassation Court 
when it comes to procedure, (2) as an international watchdog when it comes to 
grave human rights violations and massive breakdowns in rule of law, and (3) as 
an oracle of constitutional rights interpretation when it comes to fine-tuning the 
qualified rights of Articles 8–11 and 14 ECHR.
1. Procedural Law
The Court has played its most prominent role in the field of civil and criminal 
procedure, for three main reasons. First, simplifying what is in fact a fiercely 
complex topic, Civil Law States on the continent base their procedural law 
on the so-called accusatorial model, rather than on the adversarial practices of 
the Anglo-Saxon Common Law. The Court, in its case law on Articles 5 and 6 
ECHR, has pointedly criticized civil law systems (including Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) for their general lack 
of impartiality, insufficient transparency during the pre-merits phase, and the 
accumulation of functions by the same officials during different phases of the 
trial, which are values commonly associated with the adversarial system. As John 
Jackson has cogently argued, the Court is actively constructing a new “participa-
tory model” that lies between the classic forms.32 In any event, its case law on 
procedure has not been easy to digest by many States. Since implementation typi-
cally requires fundamental changes in judicial organization,33 the Court’s impact 
in this domain has transformative potential. Second, as the Convention itself 
does not protect the right to peaceful enjoyment of property, the Court adopted 
31 See Stone Sweet and Keller, this volume, Section A.2.b.
32 Jackson (2005).
33 In particular for France, see Lambert Abdelgawad and Weber, this volume, Section D.1.c.
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a broad interpretation of the procedural guarantee in Article 6(1) ECHR, thereby 
filling the gap. This move, and others like it, gave an extremely wide scope to 
civil rights that in turn generated strong resistance in countries like Austria, Swit-
zerland and Germany.34 Third, the Court’s emphasis on procedural guarantees 
for defendants has to be seen as part of a more general trend toward juridifica-
tion in international law. After a first phase in which substantive human rights 
have been developed, the international community is now focused on procedural 
aspects, and on how domestic institutions enforce rights. Since the 70’s, scholars 
and judges have worked to upgrade procedural rights. It is today a mega-trend 
of international human rights law, and with it comes an associated expansion of 
judicial authority. Among international courts, the ECtHR has been the most 
important progenitor of this trend.35 In response, several countries have made 
important legislative efforts to reduce the length of proceedings (Austria, France, 
Germany, Italy, Poland, Slovakia).36 Nonetheless, it remains an open question 
whether these reforms will, in fact, give results that meet the high requirements 
formulated by the Court.37
For every State in our survey, the majority of violations of the ECHR found by 
the Court concern Article 6 ECHR guarantees. Most alarming are broad failures 
across Europe to ensure trial within a reasonable time period. As the duration 
of court proceedings before the ECtHR has stretched to indefensible lengths,38 
the Court’s demand for timely proceedings in the Contracting States may lose 
34 See Thurnherr, this volume, Section E.1.a.
35 Aromaa and Viljanen (2006).
36 For the famous Pinto law see Candela Soriano, this volume, Section III.D.2.a.bb.
37 Scordino v. Italy (appl. no. 36813/97), Judgment (Grand Chamber), 29 March 2006, (not yet 
reported), para. 183. 
38 For the time period since the date of allocation for pending Committee and Chamber cases in 
2006 (all data were provided by the Court), http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/C8F656AA-94
C4-4A3F-A69D-0E4C6D510CA8/0/Analysis_of_statistics_2007.pdf.
Time period Chamber cases Committee cases
one year or less 8817 or 32% 27107 or 55%
one to two years 5530 or 20% 15717 or 32%
two to three years 4844 or 17% 5029 or 10%
three to four years 4064 or 15% 999 or 2%
tour to five years 2537 or 9%
more than five years 1917 or 7%
Total of cases 27709 48852
It is difficult to say what the final average time period per case is. The large figure of 55% of Com-
mittee cases are mainly due to inadmissibility decisions on the grounds of Article 35 ECHR. For 
nearly one third (31%) of the Chamber cases, the average length of proceedings is between three 
and more than five years.
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much of its persuasive and authoritative force.39 Lord Woolf has formulated it 
poignantly: “If ‘justice delayed is justice denied’, then a large proportion of the 
ECtHR’s applicants – even those who are the victims of serous violations – are 
effectively denied the justice they seek.”40 In view of the notorious human rights 
records of countries like Russia, Ukraine and Turkey, the assumption that the 
Court no longer has the necessary capacity to deal with grave human rights situa-
tions due to its own excessive caseload and delays cannot be easily dismissed. 
2. Articles 2 and 3 ECHR
Violations of the right to life (Article 2 ECHR) and the right to be free from 
torture, and inhuman and degrading treatment (Article 3 ECHR) are justifiably 
understood to be the most serious types of violations of the Convention. For 
every State in our survey, the Court has ruled on at least one claim based on ei-
ther Article 2 or 3 ECHR. Ireland, Norway, and Slovakia have never been found 
in violation of either provision. To date, the Court has found a single violation of 
at least one of these provisions by Austria, German, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland, 
and it has found only two violations by Belgium, Italy, Poland, and Sweden. 
Without downplaying the seriousness of any of these cases, it is clear that com-
pliance with Articles 2 and 3 ECHR is not a systemic problem in any of these 
States. Indeed, one might argue that part of the Court’s case law in these areas 
is a type of fine-tuning (conditions of prisons, food and body searches in deten-
tion, and so on). Other countries have had a more difficult time complying with 
these norms. Greece (5 violations), the Netherlands (8), France (10) make up 
an intermediate group, followed by Ukraine (16) the UK (21), and Russia (34). 
Turkey, with 230 findings of violation and 91 friendly settlements, constitutes an 
unfortunate class by itself. 
In its jurisprudence on Article 3 ECHR, the Court has exposed deplorable 
conditions in detention centres and prisons across Europe, including in France, 
Greece, Italy, Turkey, Russia, and Ukraine, situations otherwise tolerated by na-
tional politicians and judges. In response, the Council of Europe has committed 
itself to observing these situations closely, and in articulating higher standards 
for the regime as a whole. Another area of serious concern is the conduct of 
police authorities. In several countries, including Greece and Italy in our survey, 
the disproportionate number of immigrants of Roma origin among victims of 
violations of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR is disquieting.41 Across Europe, the trend 
towards an increasingly multicultural composition of society has taken its toll on 
39 In a similar vein, see Paraskeva, 189 et seq.
40 The Right Honourable the Lord Woolf, Review of the Working Methods of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, December 2005, http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/2005/Dec/ 
LORDWOOLFSREVIEWONWORKINGMETHODS.pdf, 8.
41 See Kaboğlu and Koutnatzis, this volume, Section C.1.e. The Council of Europe sees discrimi-
nation against the Roma population as a general human rights problem in Europe, see http://www.
coe.int/t/dg3/romatravellers/.
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standards of protection. In this area, too, the Convention (and Protocol no. 4) 
will continue to play a vital role, backed up by Council of Europe initiatives.
In countries in which the most serious human rights violations are observed, 
such as Russia and Turkey, the Court confronts delicate political conflicts (as it 
had before with respect to the UK’s problems in Northern Ireland). Turkey faces 
long-standing problems with the Greek population on Cyprus, with organized 
Kurdish separatists in the southeast provinces, and the still fragile control of the 
military by civilian authorities. In Russia, national officials have justified State-
sponsored assassination, torture, and measures resulting in massive dislocation 
and suffering as necessary responses to rebellion in Chechnya. Moreover, Russia, 
Turkey, and Ukraine have yet to establish firm foundations for the development 
of stable pluralist democracy and rule of law. Often enough to matter a great deal, 
officials in these States express hostility to human rights as alien (West European) 
norms and values that are imposed upon them. Clearly, the Court is not well 
equipped to deal with deep-rooted problems such as these; indeed, they test the 
limits of the supervisory system in dramatic fashion. Moreover, these States (to-
day the biggest drain on the Court’s resources) routinely choose not to comply 
with the Court’s rulings, thus undermining the credibility of the system as a 
whole. On the other hand, these cases reflect the Court’s strong commitment 
to closing gaps in domestic accountability where officials refuse to investigate or 
choose to ignore credible claims of serious human violations.42 
3. Articles 5 and 6 ECHR: Anti-Terrorism
In Western European countries, anti-terrorism measures have generated seri-
ous complaints, most prominently against the UK43 and Spain.44 The Court’s 
role in this area has been pivotal. Experience has shown that, in many cases, 
fundamental rights were not sufficiently guaranteed in the absence of suprana-
tional control. National courts, being close to the events, proved unable to accord 
sufficient weight to fundamental rights when balanced against security impera-
tives. The Court’s caseload in relation to Articles 5 and 6 ECHR will undoubt-
edly become more politically sensitive in the coming years, as new anti-terrorist 
measures are implemented in these countries and in France and Italy.45
4. Article 8–11 and 14: Fine-Tuning and Proportionality
The Strasbourg Court plays an important role as an oracle of rights in Europe to 
the extent that it helps to define the scope and content of substantive rights, in 
particular, those provided by Articles 8–11 and 14 ECHR. Because these rights 
overlap with national rights provisions, or fill a constitutional gap in those States 
42 Helfer (2008), 144.
43 See Besson, this volume, Section III.C.1.b.
44 See Candela Soriano, this volume, Section III.C.1.b.aa.
45 See also Wildhaber (2007), 534 et seq.
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without Bills of Rights, the Court’s jurisprudence tends to take on a transnation-
al-constitutional character. Through this jurisprudence, the Convention com-
mands the obedience of national legal systems in the way that national constitu-
tional rights do, without being constitutional in any formal sense. Further, the 
Court has adopted proportionality as the framework for adjudicating qualified 
rights under the Convention. Proportionality analysis, it can be argued, is an 
inherently constitutional mode of adjudication.46 It is also deeply intrusive in 
that it gives judges the final word on how non-judicial policy makers have al-
ready balanced conflicting interests and values. In the ECHR context, the move 
to proportionality means that it is often the Strasbourg Court that will have 
the final say on how all national officials, including judges, balance competing 
interests.
The Court adopted proportionality as a means of ensuring that States would 
take qualified rights seriously, notwithstanding the principles of subsidiarity and 
margin of appreciation. The necessity phase of the procedure – a least restrictive 
means test – narrows the scope of permissible derogations to Convention rights 
to those measures that are necessary to achieve some important public interest. 
The Court’s move not only empowered ordinary judges across Convention States 
by making them de facto constitutional judges, it also gave life to Articles 8–11 
and 14 ECHR.
Of these provisions, Article 8 ECHR has generated the greatest number of 
applications and findings of violation. Here we find a combination of the gap-
filling and feedback effects discussed above.47 The Court has used proportionality 
analysis to fashion an innovative and expansive jurisprudence on privacy and 
family life in ever-expanding zones of protection. The Court developed the right 
to family reunification as a core value of Article 8 ECHR, and that guarantee now 
plays a major role in national immigration law throughout Europe. The Court 
also invoked Article 8 ECHR to exercise control over telephone tapping, now 
extended to other forms of private communication. Since national legal regimes 
lagged behind the technological capacity of the State to eavesdrop on its citizens, 
a flood of complaints gave the Court the opportunity to define the basic standard 
of rights protection. Perhaps most spectacularly, the Court used Article 8 ECHR 
to recognize the rights of transsexuals and homosexuals, furthering inter alia the 
decriminalization of homosexuality in Europe and, in conjunction with Article 
14 ECHR, the construction of a general right to non-discrimination on grounds 
of gender and sexual preference.
The Court’s caseload concerning Article 10 ECHR (freedom of expression) is 
also striking, given that these are not new, or boutique, rights. The older States 
of the Council of Europe, Austria (28 violations), France (11), the UK (9), and 
Switzerland (7) have generated the highest number of rulings of violation, with 
46 Stone Sweet (2008).
47 See supra Section B.1.
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the exception of Turkey (120). In its balancing of freedom of the press and other 
media against other values, the Strasbourg Court has tended to downplay rights 
to personality, personal honor, and other values that national systems may accord 
more weight. The Court appears anxious to accord a vital role to the press in 
democratic society, as a watchdog of Government, and therefore interprets the 
scope of possible restrictions narrowly (through the necessity phase of propor-
tionality). In some States, including Russia, Ukraine and Turkey, the Government 
openly seeks to control the press and visual media for its own, often illiberal, 
purposes.48 Given the Court’s conception of Article 10 ECHR, it will confront 
very serious challenges from these and other States in the years to come.
The Court’s role in protecting Articles 8–11 and 14 ECHR deserves to be 
evaluated in light of its overloaded caseload and in light of the principle of sub-
sidiarity. In post-Protocol no. 11 Europe, the Court can expect to receive a steady 
stream of applications asking it, in effect, to supervise how national officials have 
balanced, that is, how they have made and applied law with reference to qualified 
rights. When the Court reviews how national officials have balanced competing 
interests under this part of the Convention, it rarely if ever guarantees the core 
essence of a right; neither does it represent an external control on allegations 
that a State grossly violates the most basic human rights, such as those under 
Articles 2 and 3 ECHR. It is instead fine-tuning outcomes that would normally 
be subject to national decision-making. Proportionality is an instrument par 
excellence of judicial fine-tuning, and of helping policy makers achieve the right 
balance between competing interests and values. There is, however, no fixed limit 
to its reach: on the contrary, proportionality fixes the boundaries of the margin 
of appreciation.
This situation poses a delicate problem for the Court. From the standpoint 
of reception, the Court often ends up with the last word on how rights are to 
be defined and applied in general measures, and used in concrete situations. 
From the point of view of its caseload, the Court’s position means that it attracts 
an ever-increasing number of demands for fine-tuning. It is obvious that the 
ECtHR cannot abandon proportionality as a general approach to the qualified 
rights; to do so at this point would undermine the Convention and the national 
judiciary’s capacities to enforce it. The Court could, however, take a more per-
missive posture with respect to how national judges enforce the proportionality 
principle. The Court could, for example, reiterate that Article 13 ECHR requires 
national judges to employ proportionality analysis; and it could announce that 
it will ensure, as a matter of procedure, that judges in fact have done so. At the 
same time, it could choose to limit the scope of its substantive review on the 
merits to how national judges have used proportionality analysis in important or 
extreme cases.
48 See Nußberger, this volume, Section D.3.c. For the infamous Article 301 of the Turkish Crimi-
nal Code, see also Kaboğlu and Koutnatzis, this volume, Section D.2.b.
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Such a move would reduce the exposure of the Court, enable it to counter 
charges of usurping national autonomy and the margin of appreciation, and help 
to forge a better partnership with national judges. It would also give the Court 
a tool to manage its docket more flexibly. On the downside, some would accuse 
the Court of abandoning its true mission, which consists in providing justice in 
individual cases. Skeptics of proportionality,49 those who consider the framework 
to be inherently unprincipled, will renew their attacks, though this cost is already 
being paid.
D. The ECHR and National Legal Systems
In this Section, we focus on how the evolution of certain structural features of the 
Convention has complicated the reception process at the domestic level.
1. Exhaustion of Local Remedies
The principle of subsidiarity is a cornerstone, a ratio conventionis, of the European 
system of human rights protection. It is a duty of national officials to protect 
human rights within their domestic legal systems and to ensure respect for the 
rights safeguarded by the Convention. For its part, the ECtHR may accept an 
application only after domestic remedies have been exhausted, and within a pe-
riod of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken (Article 
35 ECHR). At first glance, these elements would seem to comprise a framework 
under which there would be a simple and smooth transition from the national 
system to the ECHR. Yet as the reports on Switzerland, Poland, Russia, and Italy, 
among others, make apparent, determining when national remedies have been 
exhausted may be a difficult and time-consuming task, introducing a great deal 
of inter-systemic friction. The three factors that matter most – the organization 
of the national judiciary, the competences of constitutional and high courts, and 
the effectiveness of ordinary (and the availability of extraordinary) remedies – 
vary considerably across Europe. When the Court does not pay close attention to 
these differences, it produces incoherent case law.50
The Court also uses Article 35 ECHR strategically, for its own purposes: a 
restrictive interpretation of the exhaustion of local remedies rule will tend to 
close the door to applicants, whereas a broader construction will invite more 
applications. In practice, the Court seems to choose between progressive and 
narrow approaches, for different reasons. If an applicant can show that there 
would be no point in exhausting national remedies, and if the problem at hand 
seems important, the Court may simply ignore the requirement and dismiss the 
49 Bruach (2005) is a good example. 
50 Sürmeli v. Germany (appl. no. 75529/01), Judgement (Grand Chamber), 8 June 2006 (not yet 
reported); Szott-Medyńska and Others v. Poland (appl. no. 47414/99), Decision, 9 October 2003 
(not reported).
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Government’s preliminary objections.51 In doing so, the Court sends a powerful 
signal about the inadequacy of national rights protection and invites reform. 
The Court needs to be able to restrict access in order to cope with its overloaded 
docket, although the result will be denial of justice in some individual cases.
Thus, despite its prima facie intelligibility, applying the local remedies rule on 
the ground is fraught with both factual and political complexity. As this book 
shows, the Court’s decisions on admissibility deserve to be evaluated more closely, 
both by scholars and States. States should consider translating and distributing 
such decisions: they are crucial to a proper understanding of the interaction be-
tween the national and European systems. In some countries, scholarly com-
mentary on Article 35 ECHR is both abundant and highly technical whereas, 
in others, the topic is just being noticed. What is clear is that, at the interface of 
the national legal order and the ECHR, there exists considerable friction, with 
all the attendant inefficiencies (of time, money, and intellectual effort) that add 
to the system’s burdens.
2. Convention Rights as Minimal Standards
As discussed in the introduction, the traditional view was that the Convention 
established European standards of rights protection in the form of a floor be-
low which national legal protection may not fall.52 In this sense, it has always 
been recognized that the Convention harmonizes rights protection, at least at 
this minimal level. Moreover, under Article 53 ECHR, the Contracting States 
may develop higher human rights standards than those entrenched in the Con-
vention. As with Article 35 ECHR, however, this view misses what is arguably 
most important. The Court treats the Convention as a “living instrument”, and 
understands its role to be an autonomous and authoritative defender of human 
rights. Further, it has expressly committed itself to raising human rights stand-
ards whenever possible, although it typically does so only after asserting that it 
has identified an emerging consensus among the Contracting States. What this 
means for laggard States – that is, those national legal systems that are not part 
of the identification of a new consensus – is that the Convention does not con-
stitute the minimal, but rather the sole, obligatory, higher standard. Thus, one 
important meta-narrative of reception is that States are always playing catch-up 
to the Court, if some more than others.
51 See, e.g., Isayeva, Yusipova, Bazaeva v. Russia (appl. no. 57947/00; 57948/00; 57949/00), 
Judgement (First Section), 24 February 2005 (not yet reported); Isayeva v. Russia, (appl. no. 
57950/00), Judgement (First Section), 24 February 2005, (not yet reported); Akdivar v. Turkey 
(appl. no. 21893/93), Judgement (Grand Chamber), 16 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV (no. 
15), 1192, para. 67; Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticares AS v. Ireland (appl. no. 45036/98), 
Decision (Fourth Section), 13 September 2001 (not reported); Selçuk and Asker v. Turkey (appl. nos 
23184/94;23185/94), Judgement (Chamber), 24 April 1998, Reports 1998-II (no. 71), 891, paras 
70–71; McCann and Others v. United Kingdom (appl. no. 18984/91), 27 September 1995, Series A, 
Vol. 324, para. 161.
52 See Stone Sweet and Keller, this volume, Section A.1.
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The national reports show clearly that these dynamics have influenced how 
national judges perform their tasks, and how they justify new, more active, 
roles in rights protection. Some national courts directly equate national hu-
man rights with European standards. Switzerland is a telling example,53 but one 
finds variation on this theme wherever the Convention functions as a surrogate 
Bill of Rights. It is striking that most national courts have learned to follow the 
Court, and to widen the scope and standards of the rights that they enforce, with 
few difficulties. There are, arguably, a few notable exceptions. Irish judges, for 
example, consider the ECHR to state minimal standards in comparison to the 
higher standards offered under their own Constitution; and German and Italian 
judges sometimes state, or imply, as much as well. In the UK, where the courts 
cannot adopt an interpretation of the Convention that goes beyond benchmark 
standards set by the ECtHR, the Convention constitutes both a minimal and a 
maximal standard.54
This dynamic puts strains on the reception process in obvious ways, not least, 
since a State in compliance at one moment in time will be put out of compliance at 
a later point, every time the Court decides to raise levels of protection. In practice, 
Convention rights do not comprise minimal common-denominator standards, 
but rather obligatory, relatively free-standing standards above which national 
judges have an interest in developing, if they are to stay in compliance with the 
regime.
3. Beyond Individual Justice
To read the Convention literally (Articles 41 and 46 ECHR, for example), one 
might conclude that the regime’s legal system is primarily geared to delivering 
individual justice. States bear a duty to give just satisfaction to any individual 
who has been a victim of a violation of the ECHR for which they are responsible. 
However, as this book emphasizes, the Court is increasingly engaged in delivering 
what the former President of the Court, Luzius Wildhaber, Stephen Greer, and 
others characterize as “constitutional justice”.55 Today, the Court often behaves 
more as a general and prospective lawmaker than as a judge whose reach is pri-
marily particular and retrospective. In the post-Protocol no. 11 world, the Court 
functions as an authoritative oracle of rights jurisprudence for all of Europe; it 
supervises State compliance with the ECHR, whose standards are continuously 
rising; and it seeks general solutions to general problems with which it is con-
fronted. This shift in emphasis has enormous consequences for the reception 
processes. States are routinely required to reform their internal law and practices 
in response to findings of violation by the Court, not simply to provide compen-
sation to individual victims. Still more problematic, the Court finds itself in the 
53 See Thurnherr, this volume, Sections B.2.b. and B.2.c. 
54 See Besson, this volume, Section III.D.1.b.
55 Wildhaber (2000); Greer (2006), 173.
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role of a socio-political engineer when it seeks to solve systemic failures through 
pilot judgements and other types of rulings.
4. Reopening of Proceedings
It is now commonplace for States to allow the reopening of national criminal pro-
ceedings after a non-favourable judgement from Strasbourg (the only exceptions 
in our survey are Italy, Spain and Ukraine).56 This quiet revolution in European 
procedural law is remarkable for several reasons. Formally, the States enjoy a de-
gree of discretion as to the means by which to comply with a final ECtHR judge-
ment in accordance with Article 46 ECHR, while the Court refers to the well-
known principle of restitutio in integrum in international law. Thus, whenever the 
Court concludes that there has been a breach of the Convention, the respondent 
State is under a legal obligation to put an end to the breach and make reparation 
for its consequences in such a way as to restore, as far as possible, the situation 
existing prior to the violation.57 The idea that proceedings must be reopened after 
a negative judgement is not required.58 On the contrary, the idea is clearly bor-
rowed from a hierarchical system with a super-ordinate court structure.
This particular acquis conventionnel developed in a domain traditionally re-
served to national law. The diversity and complexity of national legal systems 
concerning procedural requirements (juridical time limits and formal require-
ments) and jurisdictional competences (e.g., ratione personae, rationae materiae 
and ratione temporis) have thus far impeded international harmonization in this 
area (prominent exceptions like the Lugano Convention59 and the Brussels 
Convention60 only prove the rule). Although national procedural law remains 
a pretext for national parochialism, the ECHR has provoked a first important 
56 The coordination in civil law and administrative law has not substantially evolved. Only some 
countries provide –under certain conditions – for the reopening in civil or administrative proceed-
ings (such as Germany, United Kingdom, Ireland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, 
Turkey). 
57 See, for instance, Carbonara and Ventura v. Italy (appl. no. 24638/94), Judgement (Second Sec-
tion), 30 May 2000, Reports 2000-VI, 91; Scordino v. Italy (No. 1) (appl. no. 36813/97), Judgement 
(First Section), 29 July 2004, (not reported).
58 That said, the Committee of Ministers recognized the very importance of the possibility of 
reopening national proceedings for the reception of the ECHR and recommended the adoption 
of national remedies to the Member States. Recommendation Rec. (2000)2 of the Committee of 
Ministers to member States on the re-examination or reopening of certain cases at domestic level 
following judgements of the European Court of Human Rights, 19 January 2000.
59 Lugano Convention of 16 September 1988 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters, 28 I.L.M. 620 (1989) (among EC and EFTA Member States).
60 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commer-
cial Matters, 27 September 1968, 8 I.L.M. 229, reprinted as amended in 29 I.L.M. 1413 (1990), 
substantially replaced by the Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of December 22, 2000, on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters, 
OJ 2011 L 12/1 (among EC Member States).
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breakthrough in this sensitive area of national procedure. No other international 
treaty has triggered the same effect.
5. Inter-Judicial Cooperation and Conflict
The ECHR does not provide a blueprint for an integrated system of human 
rights protection for Europe, nor does it establish how the Court should interact 
with its national counterparts. Nonetheless, the Convention, once incorporated 
into domestic law, has had an enormous impact on the judiciary across Europe. 
As discussed above, incorporation has enhanced judicial authority vis-à-vis the 
legislative and executive branches in virtually every country in our survey. The 
book also documents the extent to which the ECtHR’s case law has provoked 
changes in how national courts operate and, in countries such as France, Italy, 
and the UK, it has been a decisive factor in judicial reorganization.61
The absence of formal rules governing inter-judicial interaction in the regime 
has meant that national courts have had to choose how to define their relation-
ship with Strasbourg, and these choices have evolved over time. Some national 
courts initially opted for a strong emphasis on national autonomy, leading to a 
competitive relationship, or even conflict, open or disguised. Examples include 
the German Constitutional Court, the Austrian Constitutional Court in its early 
case-law, the Italian Constitutional Court, the Irish and British courts, and the 
French high courts until the 90’s, although judges on each of these courts have 
laboured to reduce tensions in recent years. Other courts have chosen to de-
fer to the Convention and to its Court, for their own reasons, as the Spanish 
Constitutional Tribunal did in its early jurisprudence, and as the Dutch and 
Belgian judges do. One might identify a mid-point, between conflict and defer-
ence, wherein courts seek to forge a cooperative relationship with the Strasbourg 
Court through dialogue and comity. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court, the 
Polish Constitutional Court, and, more recently, the House of Lords and the 
French Supreme Court and Council of State are good examples; and this posi-
tion may well become the norm. Finally, through negligence or ignorance, some 
courts have failed to negotiate much of a relationship at all (typical for the Greek 
courts until the 90’s, for the Turkish courts at least until 2004 and for the Russian 
courts until today).
The reports address why national judges made the choices they did, with what 
consequences for reception, and why they may have changed their attitudes over 
time. Although more research on these issues needs to be undertaken, it is clear 
that no single factor, or simple combination of factors, can explain the choices 
judges have made. In some important cases (notably France and the UK), high 
courts became more open to the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence in order to re-
61 See this volume, Lambert Abdelgawad and Weber, Section B.1.c. and D.1.c.; Besson, Section 
III.D.1.b.; Candela Soriano, Section III.D.2.b.
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duce their vulnerability to findings of violation. Non-legal factors also influence 
judicial attitudes to the ECHR regime. Independently of the formal structure 
and legal constraints (a system’s monist or dualist nature, the formal rank of the 
Convention within the legal order, the existence and extent of judicial review of 
Government acts, etc.), those national judges who desired to enforce Conven-
tion rights directly, as supra-legislative norms, found ways to do so. The reports 
also show that judicial reception of the ECHR is conditioned by the judges’ 
expertise, access to the Court’s case law, trust in the ECtHR to perform its tasks 
in good faith, and self-understanding as regulators of Government action and 
rights protectors. The fact that judges interact with non-judicial national officials 
(who are often pursuing quite different goals) complicates matters. Indeed, the 
more national judges seek to increase the effectiveness of Convention rights in 
the domestic order, the more likely it is that they will face resistance on the part 
of other government actors.
The ECHR has thus evolved in ways that generate politics – between courts, 
and between courts and non-judicial officials – that will always be, in our view, 
significantly open-ended and difficult to model.
E. The Future of the Court
The Court faces two dramatic challenges: an exploding caseload, and a steady 
stream of applications that raise very serious human rights abuses from a handful 
of problematic States. Fears that the Court has reached its extreme capacity are 
both widespread and justified. It is difficult to see how the individual complaint 
system can survive without fundamental changes in how the Court processes 
applications. The Court does not possess the necessary power and resources for 
it to oversee the kinds of deep structural domestic reform required for some 
countries to bring domestic rights standards up to bare minimal levels. In this 
Section, we briefly examine, from the perspective adopted in this book, how the 
ECHR regime might best meet its challenges in the future.62
1. Reception and Burden Sharing
One of the general claims of this volume is that the ECHR and domestic legal 
systems are significantly enmeshed in one another. If the protection of human 
rights in Europe is carried out at different levels and through various mechanisms, 
the question is how one can best distribute the overall charge of protecting hu-
man rights. In the Council of Europe system, other bodies such as the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture, the European Commission against 
Racism and Intolerance, the Advisory Committee on the Framework Conven-
62 We do not survey all of the reform proposals here, but see Helfer (2008). Helfer reviews the 
growing literature on ECHR reform, and develops an interesting approach that emphasizes “embed-
dedness” and burden sharing.
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tion for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Committee 
on Social Rights, also have rights-based remits.63 The Council of Europe also 
maintains Information Offices in some States (including Poland and Slovakia 
in our survey64), providing not only potential applicants with information on 
admissibility issues, but also giving counsel on existing domestic remedies. These 
offices save potential applicants from initiating proceedings unnecessarily or pre-
maturely. The functions of such offices could be expanded and strengthened, in 
particular in Contracting States that have a strong share in the Court’s docket.
As this volume shows, national officials have a crucial role to play in monitoring 
and enforcing Convention rights. Most important, they can incorporate the 
ECHR in ways that make it directly effective in the legal order, and they can 
develop and use mechanisms of reception. The book also demonstrates a strong 
correlation between relatively higher domestic human rights standards and rela-
tively lower numbers of applications to Strasbourg. One obvious way to reduce 
the ECtHR’s caseload is, therefore, to enhance rights protection domestically.
As the data show, a small handful of countries, with massive, systemic problems, 
generate a large proportion of total applications. Such problems include judicial 
dysfunction (underpaid judges, poor infrastructure, and lack of impartiality), 
the failure on the part of politicians to commit themselves to values associated 
with the rule of law, corruption, and deep-rooted political problems, including 
the oppression of minorities and secessionist movements. Among the countries 
covered in this volume, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine fit this description. In these 
contexts, a judgment of the Court may have little effect beyond the individual 
applicant. The Court, in pilot rulings, may seek to persuade or cajole such States 
to take comprehensive measures to correct problems at the root, but it can ill 
afford to allow dealing with the worst pathologies to preempt its other important 
roles. Since the advent of Protocol no. 11, the number of applications to the 
ECtHR has also steadily increased in Contracting States with fairly good human 
rights records (such as Austria, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Swe-
den, and Switzerland). We have to accept that in a Europe of Rights, “going to 
Strasbourg” will be attractive to those who wish to see new rights recognized, or to 
raise standards of protection for established rights. It is an important function of 
the Court to respond to these demands and to participate fully in the progressive 
development of rights in Europe, in meaningful partnership with national judges 
and other officials.
63 In addition, it is important to mention the Commissioner for Human Rights established under 
the auspices of the Council of Europe. See Resolution (99)50 on the Council of Europe Commis-
sioner for Human Rights, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 7 May 1999 at its 104th 
Session and Article 13 of Protocol no. 14 amending Article 36(3) ECHR.
64 See Krzyżanowska-Mierzewska, this volume, Sections J.1.c. and J.2.c.
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2. Remedies
Reform of the remedial requirements under the Convention could provide an-
other means of burden-sharing between the Strasbourg and the national courts. 
The Court continuously emphasizes the States’ obligation to vest the domestic 
courts with the necessary competencies and resources to enable them to give full 
effect to Convention rights.65 National judges normally constitute the final phase 
of national remedial systems, and thus act as the gatekeepers between domestic 
legal orders and the Court. Although Article 13 ECHR was for many years a 
“dormant effective remedy clause”,66 the Court now stresses the importance of 
that Article,67 not least in order to urge a more proactive stance on the part of 
the national courts. As this volume shows, States will not be able to manage 
the variegated demands of the ECHR regime without enabling strong judicial 
enforcement of rights.
Entrusting the determination of “reparation” and “just satisfaction” to the 
national courts (reform of Article 41 ECHR) has also been proposed,68 not least 
since national authorities are normally better acquainted with the relevant criteria 
for assessing damages. Any delegation of tasks under the ECHR will run the risk 
of producing too much variation across the States, and the same would be true in 
the area of compensation. The ECHR makes awards in accordance with its own 
criteria, autonomously, rather than on the basis of national concepts. Conferring 
such authority on national courts would entail divergence, and such variation 
could, if too great, offend the very principles of fairness and justice that the 
ECHR is designed to protect. There would, therefore, need to be clear safeguards 
to protect individuals against States that might not live up to expectations, and 
this control function could only be performed by the Court.
65 See Kudła v. Poland (appl. no. 30210/96), Judgement (Grand Chamber), 26 October 2000, 
Reports 2000-XI, 197, para. 152: “(...) Article 13, giving direct expression to the States’ obligation 
to protect human rights first and foremost within their own legal system, establishes an additional 
guarantee for an individual in order to ensure that he or she effectively enjoys those rights. The 
object of Article 13, as emerges from the travaux préparatoires (...), is to provide a means whereby 
individuals can obtain relief at national level for violations of their Convention rights before having 
to set in motion the international machinery of complaint before the Court. From this perspective, 
the right of an individual to trial within a reasonable time will be less effective if there exists no 
opportunity to submit the Convention claim first to a national authority; and the requirements 
of Article 13 are to be seen as reinforcing those of Article 6 § 1, rather than being absorbed by the 
general obligation imposed by that Article not to subject individuals to inordinate delays in legal 
proceedings.”
66 Malinverni (1998), 647–650. 
67 See, e.g., Kudła v. Poland (supra note 65), paras 146–160; Sürmeli v. Germany (appl. 
no. 75529/01), Judgement (Grand Chamber), 8 June 2006 (not yet reported), paras 97–117; Aksoy 
v. Turkey (appl. no. 21987/93), Judgement, 18 December 1996, Reports 1996-IV, 2260, paras. 
51–57.
68 Mahoney (2007).
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3. Reforming the Regime
Over the past twenty years, the ECHR has been amended by a series of Protocols,69 
ultimately leading to the transformation of the legal system occasioned by Proto-
col no. 11. This strategy – of building the regime progressively through protocols 
– may have reached its limits. Most important, with the accession of the Eastern 
European States, the Council of Europe now comprises a much less homoge-
neous family of Contracting States. Because each additional Protocol requires 
ratification by all Contracting States (each State possesses a veto over proposed 
changes), it may be difficult or impossible to reform the regime through proto-
cols in the future. If so, the ECHR regime may itself become mired in systemic 
problems for which no systemic solutions will be forthcoming. The Court might 
be allowed to propose changes to its jurisdiction to the Council of Europe, which 
would approve them by majority or a qualified majority of States. Yet such a 
reform would itself require unanimity, which may not be forthcoming.
Protocol no. 14 – which is strongly supported by the Court – illustrates the 
problem.70 Protocol no. 14 aims at giving the Court the necessary procedural 
means and flexibility to process applications within a reasonable time, while ena-
bling it to concentrate on those it finds most important. Under Protocol no. 14, 
the Court could declare a case inadmissible unless the applicant has not suffered 
a “significant disadvantage”.71 These and other provisions would reduce the time 
spent by the Court on manifestly inadmissible and repetitive cases. Although 
these reforms are no doubt necessary, it is already clear that they would not be 
sufficient to overcome the Court’s overload.72 Yet, alone among High Contract-
ing Parties, Russia refuses to ratify Protocol no. 14, blocking its adoption.
One possible solution might be to allow the Court to undertake significant 
systemic reform on its own. The Council of Europe could authorize the Court to 
use Rule 103 (of the Rules of the Court) to amend its procedures as the Court 
sees fit, while reserving its own authority (under unanimity) to quash such 
changes. The Convention (Article 32 ECHR) also confers jurisdiction on the 
Court over all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Con-
vention and the Protocols. The Court might use these plenary powers to decide, 
in an appropriately explicit manner, to delegate some types of cases (of minor 
importance and without systemic implications) to national judges. As we argued 
above,73 the Court could also choose to reduce its level of scrutiny when it comes 
to how national judges fine-tune the protection of qualified rights through pro-
69 See supra Section A.1.
70 For an overview of Protocol no. 14, see Caflisch and Keller; Greer (2005). For the ECtHR’s 
view on Protocol No. 14 and other proposed reforms, see Opinion of the Court on the Wise Persons’ 
Report, adopted by the Plenary Court, 2 April 2007.
71 Article 12(3)(b) of Protocol no. 14 amending Article 35 ECHR.
72 For a discussion of a range of reform proposals, see the Report of the Group of Wise Persons to the 
Committee of Ministers, CM(2006)203, 15 November 2006.
73 See supra Section C.4.
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portionality balancing. Such changes would enable the Court to concentrate on 
cases involving more serious human rights violations, and on defining the con-
tent and scope of rights, which national judges would then help to fine-tune.
F. A Europe of Rights
In post-Protocol no. 11 Europe, it makes little sense to conceptualize the ECHR 
as an international regime, external to the Contracting States. The Convention 
has a significant presence within national legal orders, even where this pres-
ence is resisted and opposed. Today, national officials routinely participate in 
a transnational judicial process whose reach into domestic law and politics is 
limited only by the ever-widening scope of the Convention itself, as determined 
by a transnational court. In virtually every State examined in this book, the Con-
vention has provoked some measure of significant structural and procedural in-
novation, including the development of mechanisms for coordinating national 
law and the Convention, as the latter evolves. Reception processes have, in turn, 
provoked deep changes in European Government, through the accumulation of 
incremental, step-by-step adjustments to the demands of the Strasbourg Court. 
National officials are, gradually but inexorably, being socialized into a Europe of 
rights, a unique transnational legal space now seeking to develop its own logic of 
political and juridical legitimacy. The success of this endeavor will depend partly 
on the Council of Europe’s ability to reform the ECHR legal system, and partly 
on the extent to which national officials sustain reception processes as means of 
further incorporating the Convention into national legal orders.
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